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Stockholm 
Going Beyond the Human through Dance 
Julia Kristeva 
Université Paris Diderot – Paris 7 
As I am by no means a specialist of dance, your invitation is both an 
honour and a surprise.  I came up with my own explanation: you’ve called 
upon me perhaps because I DANCE with concepts, disciplines and genres in 
my essays and novels!  I thank you then, for having invited me to consider 
that my contributions to contemporary thought: intertextuality, strangeness, 
the significance of language, the subject-in-process, abjection and reliance – to 
name only a few – can be understood and practised as dance, which as I see 
it, is this nimble movement of incorporated thought.   
I say: “nimble movement of incorporated thought,” and in risking this 
definition of dance, I still cannot promise to construct a working theory of 
your practice.  Perhaps this will be possible after having clarified several 
preliminary ideas, far outside of your field. Yet working in its proximity and 
attentive to your research, I ask myself:  If dance or rather dances in the 
plural have always accompanied religious rites and their offshoots, if men 
and women’s dancing is inseparable from the experience of this Homo 
Religiosus which is Homo Sapiens, how is it possible to dance if God is dead?  
In saying “God is dead” I am referring to an event that happened in Europe 
– and nowhere else – which cut ties with religious tradition. An 
unprecedented event whose way was paved by the Greco-Judeo-Christian 
tradition.  But “God is dead” also means that some use religion as a political 
tool if not a political weapon, as in the case of religious fundamentalism. 
Hannah Arendt already established that those who use God for political 
aims are just as nihilistic as the self-declared nihilists, if not more.    
And what about conflicts between religions? What about the junction 
and elucidation of the need to believe and of the desire to know?  That is the 
question I investigate in This Incredible Need to Believe (2007), and it is THE 
question of the 21st century.   We cannot respond to it without continuously 
refounding this other space, which detached itself from the religious 
continent, and which is precisely secularization or humanism. It was built in 
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Europe starting in the Renaissance and developed through the 18th century 
with Erasmus, Diderot, Voltaire, Rousseau, Goethe and many other rebels 
up to Freud and his successors who have inspired my reflexion. 
I understand humanism in the Nietzschean sense of a “transvaluation of 
values” that puts “a big question mark on matters of weighty seriousness.”  
Such work is endless, exorbitant and long-term. It is a matter of taking the 
crisis that is shaking our world seriously. We are undergoing not only an 
economic, political and social crisis but an existential one in which we are 
confronted with a major unknown: What is a man? What is a woman?   
The interminable response to this question associates, I believe, today’s 
crisis with the crisis of Homo Sapiens. Concretely speaking, it’s a question of 
human identity in general, and subsequently of the crisis of our multiple 
identities: sexual, ethnic, racial, national, religious, familial, etc. This crisis 
calls upon the human sciences, which developed after the disintegration of 
the theological continent two centuries ago.  But this response depends 
equally on our possibility -- or not -- of creating new languages: new 
literature, new painting, new dance.  
In the 13th and 14th centuries, Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) in his Divine 
Comedy (cantica I, 69) looked for a language capable of “exceeding the 
human”: “transhumanar” was the term he used, a neologism representative 
of what is called his “new style.”  Rather than the most exigent theory, I 
hope it will be dance that speaks one of the new languages of the human 
comedy. Dance as a radical gesture of this transhumanar which humanity 
needs, if we refuse to wallow in this endemic, inevitable crisis that the 
growth of technology and virtual finance has imposed on men and women, 
and if, on the contrary, we want to sense the seeds germinating while 
awaiting the much desired renaissance to come.  
In this spirit, I must first specify what I mean by humanism. The 
ambition to define it has often given rise to fabulous claims, or even 
disappointment when its meaning was misconstrued, leading to impasses, 
impostures, even crimes.     
Invited by Pope Benedict the XVIth to a recent interreligious meeting 
for peace in Assisi in October 2011, as a humanist at the head of a delegation 
of non-believers, and this for the first time in the long history of religions, I 
developed ten principles of humanism which I would like to introduce to 
you. 
I will then maintain that new political actors are incarnating and 
realizing the refoundation of humanism which the globalized world direly 
needs.  I will take as examples two of these experiences which cruelly lack a 
means of expression in today’s codes of humanism: adolescents in want of 
ideals and maternal passion at the crossroads of biology and meaning.  
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At these crossroads of body and meaning, of biology and sublimation, it 
is perhaps dance more than other trans-linguistic experience that informs and 
accompanies the process of transhumanization as it counters the crisis and 
exceeds the impending threat of apocalypse.    
Ten Principles for the Humanism of the Twenty-First 
Century 
What is humanism? A great question mark on the most serious of 
issues? This reality is a product of the European, Greco- Judeo-Christian 
tradition as I already mentioned. And at the same time it continues to 
promise, to disappoint, to re-constitute itself. Here I stray a bit from dance, 
but it’s with the conviction that the deeper sense of your research converges 
with the agitation [le soubresaut] at the very depths of our civilization. 
1. The humanism of the twenty-first century is not a theomorphism. 
Neither "value" nor ulterior "goal,” Man with a capital M does not exist. 
After the Holocaust and the Gulags, humanism has a duty to remind men 
and women that we are not the only legislators, but it is uniquely through 
the continual questioning of our personal, historical and social situation that 
we can make decision for society and history. Today, far from 
deglobalization, it is necessary to invent new international rules to regulate 
and control finance and the global economy, and finally to create a world 
authority based on universal ethics and solidarity.  
2. Humanism is a process of permanent refoundation that develops 
through the ruptures that are innovations. Memory does not regard the past: 
the Bible, the Gospels, the Koran, the Rig Veda, the Tao, live in the present. 
In order that humanism might develop and re-found itself, the moment has 
come to reinterpret the moral codes built throughout history: without 
weakening them, in order to problematize them, to renew them in the face of 
new singularities.  
3. Humanism is a feminism. The liberation of desires could only lead to 
the emancipation of women. The battle for economic, legal and political 
parity necessitates a new reflection on the choice and responsibility of 
motherhood. Secularization is still the only civilization that lacks a discourse 
on motherhood. This passionate bond between mother and child, through 
which biology becomes meaning, alterity, and word, is a "reliance" that, 
while different from the paternal function and from religiosity, completes 
the full participation in the humanist ethic.  
4. In order that the desires of men and women may be rekindled, 
Humanism teaches us to take care of them. The loving care for each other, 
the care of the earth, the young, the sick, the disabled, the elderly 
dependents, constitute inner experiences that create new proximities and 
surprising solidarity. We have no other way to experience the 
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anthropological revolution, already announced by the leaps of the sciences, 
from uncontrollable processes of technology and finance, and the inability of 
the pyramidal democratic model to properly channel these innovations.  
5. Man does not make history, but we are history. For the first time, 
Homo Sapiens is capable of destroying the earth and himself in the name of 
his beliefs, religions or ideologies. Similarly, for the first time men and 
women are able to reassess in total transparency the constituent religiosity of 
the human being. But the hypothesis of destruction is not the only possible 
one. No one knows what kind of human beings will succeed us, we who are 
engaged in this unprecedented anthropological and cosmic transvaluation. 
The re-founding of humanism is not a providential dogma, nor an 
intellectual game, it is a gamble.  
The age of suspicion is no longer enough. Faced with increasingly grave 
crisis and threats, the time has come to gamble. We must dare to bet on the 
continuous renewal of the capacity of men and women to listen and learn 
together. So that, in the "multiverse" surrounded by a void, mankind can 
continue to pursue his creative destiny for a long time to come. 
In this multiverse, there are two new political actors that speak very 
particularly to creators such as yourselves regarding this language that 
surpasses the human – this language which I believe dance to be: these two 
actors are adolescents and maternal passion. 
Adolescence: A Syndrome of Ideality 
1. As opposed to the child, a polymorphic pervert, according to Freud 
– the child who wants to know where babies come from and who 
Freud compares to a “laboratory researcher” – the adolescent is a 
believer. The adolescent is not a “researcher” in a laboratory but a 
believer. We are all adolescents when we are enthralled by the 
absolute.  Freud did not preoccupy himself with adolescents 
because he was himself a firm non-believer, the most irreligious 
person who ever existed.  Faith implies a passion for what 
psychoanalysis calls an “object relation”: faith is potentially 
fundamentalist, as is the adolescent. Romeo and Juliette are 
excellent examples of this; I’ll come back to them later. However, 
because the sadomasochistic nature of our drives and desires is 
inevitable, adolescent belief that the Ideal Object exists is 
continually threatened. 
I will assert then, that the adolescent is a believer of the object relation and/or of its 
impossibility.  Thus formulated, the question implies a parameter that we 
have trouble taking seriously: this parameter is ideality. 
2. What is the ideality syndrome? The adolescent Oedipus complex is 
violent because it operates on the carrier wave of idealization.  The 
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adolescent, whose psyché is rooted in the polymorphous perversity 
of the young child, separates from the parental couple by replacing 
it with a new model.  In doing so, the narcissism of the Ego, tied up 
with its ideals, overflows the object and gives way to the amorous 
passion specific to the drive-ideality intrication. 
The intensity of this new satisfaction is procured thanks to something not 
sufficiently brought out in Freudian theory: namely, the inclusion of the 
object in narcissism happens in the guise of belief. The adolescent acquires 
the certainty that there exists – an absolute satisfaction. That he or she can 
erase the original and tragic Oedipus complex, and rush towards a new love 
that will open the doors to new paradises.  Images, ideologies, different 
forms of knowledge and existential models are all brought into play to shore 
up an idealized narcissism unfurling over others and which surpasses in 
strength all former ideals. Ideality dominates the adolescent unconscious: 
adolescent drive and pleasure are structured not only as a language but as 
an ideality.  
Let me sum this up as follows: The belief that there exists an ideal object 
(be it a partner, a profession or a creation), is accompanied by the absolute 
belief that the parental couple must be surpassed and even abolished so that 
the adolescent subject can escape into an idealized, paradisiacal variant of 
absolute satisfaction. The Judeo-Christian paradise is an adolescent creation: 
the adolescent takes pleasure in the paradise syndrome, which conversely, 
can also become a source of suffering if absolute ideality turns into cruel 
persecution.  Because he or she believes that the other, surpassing the 
parental other, not only exists but that he or she provides absolute 
satisfaction, the adolescent believes that the Great Other - God - exists, and is 
pleasure itself. The slightest disappointment of this ideality syndrome casts 
the adolescent into the ruins of paradise and leads toward delinquent 
conduct. 
Believers and Nihilists 
We understand that, structured by idealization, adolescence is 
constituted through the malady of ideality: Why? Structured by a propensity 
for belief, the adolescent is easily carried away by enthusiasm, romanticism 
and even fanaticism. The adolescent is a mystic of the Object of love. When 
this fantasy fails to direct toward a process of sublimation (school, 
profession, vocation), the failure of the paradise syndrome inevitably leads 
to depression and takes the common form of boredom: “If I don’t have 
Everything, I get bored”; this opens the way to delinquent conduct. But this 
conduct is merely the flip side of the malady of ideality, since the need for 
ideality persists beneath this delinquency and supports aggressive behavior. 
It in no way signals the abolition or the on-going destruction of ideality. 
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Thus drug addiction abolishes the conscience but fulfills the belief in the 
absolute of orgasmic regression within the experience of hallucinatory 
pleasure. 
On the other hand, anorexic behavior breaks with the maternal line and 
reveals the young anorexic woman’s battle against femininity. Yet this self-
destruction, this death-wish operates to the benefit of an over-investment in 
the “hard-lined” body, which echoes back to the fantasy of an absolute 
spirituality.  Through this fantasy the entire body disappears in a Beyond, 
charged with paternal connotations.    
Romeo and Juliet: The Ideal and Impossible Couple 
Let’s take another example. The perpetuation of the paradise syndrome, 
notably in the bourgeois couple, has become a pillar of the established now 
globalized social order maintained by hackneyed television “soap operas” 
and magnified by “gossip” magazines. This ideal and thus impossible couple 
is at the heart of classical ballet and persists in modern dance – its 
prototypes are Adam and Eve, Dante and Beatrice at the firmament of 
heaven, and Romeo and Juliet. 
In our culture, Shakespeare’s (1564-1616) Romeo and Juliet (1591 or 1594) 
is the paradigm of this fantastical construction. The mutual idealization that 
two adolescents share is experienced as a rejection of parental authority: 
Romeo and Juliet’s love for one another is fueled all the more by the fact that 
their ideal couple defies the Montague and Capulet clans who hate one 
another and engage in a merciless feud.  This young couple’s ideal is defiant 
and secret as all adolescent acts aspire to be.  Moreover, the reciprocal 
idealization of the two lovers is perceived by all as “fate.” What is fate? I’d 
say that fate is the adolescent belief that one’s pleasure is legitimate and 
justified, although it is impossible. Several lines of these Shakespearean 
adolescents resonate with Marlowe: “It lies not in our power to love, or hate, 
For will in us is over-rul'd by fate.” The fate of idealized relationships, both 
indulged and impossible. Nevertheless, as Shakespeare’s genius powerfully 
reveals, the belief that the Ideal Other inevitably exists, is fragile and has 
difficulty withstanding the assaults of the adolescent’s latent polymorphous 
perversity remaining from childhood. Here are two examples, which serve 
to prove this. First, beneath the exalted discourse of the lovers one perceives 
sadomasochist desire.  Juliette literally cuts up Romeo’s body at nightfall: 
“Come, gentle night/come, loving, black-brow’d night./ Give me my 
Romeo; and when he shall die/ Take him and cut him out in little stars …” 
(III, II, 9-25). As for Romeo, his jealousy emerges as a fatal pleasure in 
stabbing his male rivals: “O I am fortune’s fool!,” he cries out as he stabs 
Tybalt and Paris. In the end, this paradisiacal ideal of the couple turns out to 
be impossible. Romeo and Juliet die: in 1591 or in 1594 Shakespeare was no 
longer an adolescent.  He had left his wife Anne  Hathaway, and his son, 
Hamnet, had just died. “Romeo and Juliet,” his ninth play in the second 
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cycle of his lyrical masterpieces (along with A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream), reads as a farewell to the adolescent belief that the Ideal Object exists. 
Let’s return to the current state of affairs and ask ourselves: how can the 
psychoanalyst, as well as the dancer and the spectator, take into account the 
fact that the unconscious of the adolescent believer is constructed as a high-
risk ideality? Civilizations commonly referred to as primitive have long used 
initiation rites to assert symbolic authority (divine for the invisible world, 
political for this world) and to justify the acting out of what we would 
qualify today as perverse by condoning initiatory sexual practices. In our 
Western culture, notably in medieval Christianity, mortification rituals and 
excessive fasting channeled the anorexic and sadomasochistic behaviors of 
adolescents, and in doing so, either downplayed or glorified them.   In yet 
another way, this time secular, what seems to me to be an imaginary 
elaboration of the adolescent crisis is the birth of the European novel shaped in 
the Renaissance around the adolescent character.  The young page serving 
his Lady is a recurrent trope of the courtly romance in which a complex 
range of homosexual relations, more or less developed, are played out. 
Those are some solutions from the past, but today the question for 
psychoanalysis is: are we able to innovate when confronted with adolescent 
crises? And if so, how does psychoanalysis avoid the pitfall of stabilizing the 
crisis of ideality into the married couple, that temporary happy end of the 
bourgeois novel? Even today, popular literature continues to draw from this 
narrative logic developed during the Renaissance. Even hard-core sex fails to 
break out of this logic and is easily assimilated into it. Compared to the 
diverse ways of dealing with adolescent ideality that have preceded us, we 
might wonder if psychoanalysis is indeed innovative. And if so, how?  
Adolescents come to us because they need us to recognize their ideality 
syndrome.  We must articulate and share our understanding of it if we are to 
comprehend and accurately interpret the delinquent behavior of the 
adolescent in crisis itself as a source of extreme jouissance – and in search of a 
simulacrum of paradise. Only later should the analyst attempt to point out 
the negative aspects of this behavior which is necessarily a revolt: a revolt is 
of the Oedipal or Oresterean order. In other words, only the analyst’s 
capacity to recognize and to name the idealizing course of adolescent drives 
will provide a credible and effective transference – and thus be capable of 
metabolizing the need to believe not through nihilist acting out, but through 
the pleasure that comes with thinking, questioning and analyzing.  And to 
accompany his rebellions, his doubts, and his malaises in this way while 
conserving this universal component, this need to believe, which structures 
the adolescent. 
As I tell you about how the analyst is confronted with the adolescent’s 
need to believe, I encourage you to think about how dance can respond in its 
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own particular way to these same needs manifested by adolescent malaise in 
our civilization. 
In doing so, we would be better able to interpret the variants of our 
civilization’s new malaise and this new renaissance of the “need to believe” 
which is an unexpected dimension underlying this crisis.  This is a need 
which everybody shares, for there is in each of us a perpetual adolescent. 
Motherhood Today 
Secularization is the only civilization to lack a discourse on 
motherhood. We think we understand what a Jewish or a Christian mother 
is, but what about a modern mother? What is she in this space between the 
lover, the working woman, and the activist for women’s liberation and 
artificial reproduction, or, on the contrary, returning to the protective values 
of the traditional family? 
Everyday the life sciences and obstetrics are gaining increased mastery 
over the enigma of gestation which, due to its very status as an enigma, 
formerly conferred power upon the mother while at the same time anxiously 
taking it away. And yet feminine fertility and pregnancy not only continue 
to fascinate our collective imagination, but also serve as a sanctuary for the 
sacred. The position of modern religiosity would hold the “ beyond” as no 
longer being above our heads but in the womb.  Today motherhood is 
imbued with what remains of religious feeling.  
Contemporary psychoanalysis seeks to shed some light on maternal 
passion. At an international conference on psychoanalysis, I recently 
proposed the existence of a maternal eroticism that I call reliance. This word, 
in French, carries echoes of the word “lien,” to link or to connect, and 
confiance, trust or confidence, as well as an alternative to religion (religion-
reliance). Between biology and sense, attachment and expulsion, love and 
hate, violent influence and generous transmission, maternal reliance is a 
surprising and necessary version of ethics we might call a herethic. 
Maternal passion understood as “reliance” is perhaps the only passion 
that is not virtual and subject to spectacular manipulation and which 
constitutes the prototype for the love relation. It begins with the pregnant 
woman’s passion for herself, a “herself” reflecting a reinforced and destabilized 
narcissism: the pregnant woman is losing her identity, for, in the wake of the 
lover-father’s intervention, she splits in two, harboring an unknown third 
person, a shapeless pre-object. In other words, though dominated by 
narcissism, this initial maternal passion remains triangular. Nevertheless, 
the absent or inward looking gaze of the Madonnas with child of the Italian 
Renaissance, such as those by Giovanni Bellini, openly show what many of 
us know: that the pregnant woman “looks” at the father and the world 
without “seeing” him; she is elsewhere. 
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The first stage of this inwardly turned passion is followed by the 
mother’s passion for a new subject, her child: provided that the child stops 
being her double and that she detaches herself so that the child can gain 
autonomy.  This motion of expulsion, of detachment is essential.  This is a way 
of saying that, from the outset, maternal passion is inhabited by the negative.  
 Freud was convinced that  “loving thy neighbor as thyself” was an 
illusion, a pious wish of the Evangelists. Indeed, such love has only been 
attained by Saint Francis and other rare mystics like him.  I believe that 
“loving one’s neighbor as oneself” brings us back to this enigma – even 
more obscure than the mystery of gestation – of what the “good enough 
mother” is.  It is she who allows the infans to create a transitional space 
(Winnicott), a space which enables the infant to think. Because it is not easy 
to love oneself: generally speaking, it is either impossible or else tragic. 
However, the “good enough mother” succeeds in loving her child as herself, 
and then as another self.  
On the cultural level, I’ve noticed that in cases of “feminine genius” (be 
it outside of the maternal experience and in ventures as diverse as those 
undertaken by Hannah Arendt, Melanie Klein and Colette) there is an object 
relation from the very beginning of the psychic life. This is quite different 
from Freud’s postulation of a “narcissism without an object” at birth and 
from “masculine genius” (philosophers, artists) which is more directed 
towards solipsistic incantations and the dramas of subjectivity per se. And 
yet to maintain that for a woman, and even more so for a mother, there is an 
Other early on in the psychic life is hardly idyllic. For this precocious object 
relation is characterized by instability, an instability likely to turn into manic 
exaltation or depression and aggression: him or me, projection-
identification.  
   This drama nevertheless has a positive side, as this passion can allow 
the mother to create a possible bond with the other, to elaborate the passionate 
destructiveness underlying all types of relations which motherhood in 
particular makes us experience all the more sharply (“I love him and I hate 
him”).  This is why, with its violent emotions of love and hate, motherhood 
resembles an analysis of borderline states and perversions. I share the opinions 
of some authors, for whom feminine sexuality takes refuge in motherhood to 
live out its perversion and madness, which can also be a way of enabling 
their working-through madness. Seduction, fetishizing the child’s body and 
its accessories, emotional outbursts, manic states - it isn’t rare that the very 
possibility of thinking is threatened by the mother’s  passion.  It then takes 
on a more lethal meaning. 
However, a certain detachment-depassioning takes place in most cases. 
And it’s from this that maternal love derives its definitive psychic and vital 
support.  Because most mothers are not in analysis, one has to concede that 
there is something in the very structure of the mother’s experience that 
encourages this metabolism of passion by depassioning. I suggest considering 
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three factors within maternal passion itself: the place of the father, time, and 
language acquisition.  
I will say only a few words about time and language in maternal passion. 
The child’s language acquisition implies that the mother also re-learns 
language.  In the projective identification of the mother and child, the 
mother inhabits the mouth, lungs and digestive tube of her baby and by 
accompanying his Echolalia, she leads him towards signs, sentences, stories: 
hence infans becomes a child, a speaking subject. Each mother accomplishes in 
her own way the Proustian search for “time past.”  
As for temporality, referring as it does in Western philosophy to the time 
of death (which also haunts the experience of motherhood, of course) here, in 
the case of motherhood, it is dominated by another caesura: that of 
beginning. Of course, both parents experience conception and giving birth as 
initial acts marking a beginning. Yet the mother feels it most strongly 
because of the importance of her own body’s involvement in the process. For 
her, this new beginning that is birth is not only a conjuration of 
death.  Philosophers have taught us that the logic of freedom does not reside 
in transgression, as one might readily suppose, but precisely in the capacity to 
begin. I call this maternal experience of temporality, which is neither the 
instant nor the irretrievable flow of time (which preoccupies men, who tend 
to be more obsessive than women), duration by means of new beginnings. Being 
free means having the courage to begin anew: such is the philosophy of 
motherhood. 
So what are the excesses which underlie maternal passion?  The 
temporality of maternal passion can be viewed analytically as a kind of 
detachment in relation to the sole object, as an invitation to the plurality of 
beings and relations; it can be seen as the source of “depassioning” and 
freedom, which is ultimately freedom from passion. We see that while being 
the prototype of human passion, maternal passion is also the prototype of the 
letting go of passion which allows us to take our distance in relation to the two 
tormentors of the human psyche which are sexual drives and the object of love. 
This brings me to the maternal passion’s capacity for sublimation. It is 
because the maternal passion is a continual sublimation that creativity is made 
possible for the child. 
Freud had observed a cycle of sublimation in the emission and 
reception of jokes. Indeed, the author of the joke neutralizes his affects by 
communicating only his surface thought: he stands back from his sexual 
drives and latent thoughts and only invests his listener’s reaction.  The 
storyteller’s pleasure is doubled when the listener understands the hidden 
meaning of the joke, be it a trap! The listener experiences the ambiguous 
pleasure of understanding that he was trapped. This cycle of sublimation is 
comparable to what happens when mother and child exchange words and 
thoughts. For this exchange involves the emission of  ”enigmatic signifiers,” 
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preverbal or verbal, by the mother; the withdrawal of the mother’s sexual 
drives, her attentiveness to the reaction of her child alone; and the surplus of 
pleasure created, or the encouragement given to the child’s response.  The 
mother does not invest in her own message, but only the child’s response 
from which she procures even greater jouissance and which in turn she 
magnifies and encourages. 
Those who claim that maternal passion lacks humor are mistaken: if 
mothers can transform their hold on the child into a sublimatory cycle 
resembling witticism and which promotes the pleasure of thinking, they are 
living proof of Hegel’s claim that women are “the eternal irony of the 
community.”  
To put it differently, by her progressive depassioning and or by her 
aptitude for sublimation, the mother allows her child to represent not the 
mother, but the mother’s absence: if and only if she leaves the child free to 
appropriate maternal thought by recreating it in his own way of thinking-
representing. The “good enough mother” would be she who knows how to 
leave, to make room for pleasure, for the child, for thought. To leave room, in 
other words, to disappear. 
Thus a kind of symbolic matricide operates through the child’s acquisition 
of language and thought, which diminishes his need to take pleasure from 
his mother’s body; he comes to find pleasure in thinking, first with his 
mother, as far as the intermittent nature of maternal thought permits, then 
alone, in her stead. 
We’ve seen maternal passion as a cleft between the mother’s hold over her 
child and sublimation. This division makes the risk of madness ever present, 
and yet this very risk offers a perpetual chance for culture.  Religious myths 
spin their webs around this divide.  In the Bible the woman is a “hole” (such 
is the meaning of the word “woman”  - nekayva - in Hebrew) and a queen; 
the Virgin is a “hole” in the Christian trinity father/son/holy ghost and a 
Queen of the Church. Through these imaginary constructions, religions 
address this maternal division: by recognizing it, they perpetuated it but 
also found a way of balancing it.  A kind of working-through of maternal 
madness came of this, one which made possible the existence of a humanity 
endowed with a complex psychic functioning, capable of having an inner 
life and of being creative in the outer world.  
On the contrary, by turning all our attention on the biological and social 
aspects of motherhood as well as on sexual freedom and equality, we have 
become the first civilization which lacks a discourse on the complexity of 
motherhood.  My dream is that the arguments I’m trying to develop here will 
help to remedy this lack, that they will stimulate mothers and those who 
accompany them to sharpen our understanding of this passion, pregnant 
with madness and sublimity.  This is what motherhood lacks today. 
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The adolescent and the mother are two eternal actors in human 
existence that reveal themselves to be decisive actors in this transhumanar, in 
this surpassing of the human that concerns us at the beginning of this third 
millennium. By incarnating their dramatic experiences, dance could perhaps 
accompany them with the necessary delicacy that is lacking in contemporary 
ethics and politics. The refoundation of humanism necessitates the 
revelation of your art – through the gravity of its buoyancy. Thank you for 
having given me the occasion to remind you of this. 
 
